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Abstract: The question of whether opinions of stubborn agents result in Nash equilibrium under the presence of troll
is investigated in this study. The opinion dynamics is modelled as a differential game played by n agents during a finite
time horizon. Two types of agents, ordinary agents and troll, are considered in this game. Troll is treated as a malicious
stubborn content maker who disagrees with every other agent. On the other hand, ordinary agents maintain cooperative
communication with other ordinary agents and they disagree with the troll. Under this scenario, explicit expressions of
opinion trajectories are obtained by applying Pontryagin’s principle on the cost function. This approach provides insight
into the social networks that comprise a troll in addition to ordinary agents.
Key words: Opinion dynamics, social network, differential game, Nash equilibrium, Pontryagin’s principle, troll

1. Introduction
Opinion dynamics is defined as the study of how large groups interact with each other and reach consensus [1].
Although research on opinion dynamics dates back to 50s such as [2], the topic has been booming in the past
decade owing to the rise of the social networks. The agent based models of social networks discussed in the
survey [3] is one of the hottest topics that the control theory community is focusing on. In addition to social
networks, opinion dynamics has numerous applications such as jury panels, government cabinets, and company
board of directors as noted in [3].
Naive approach on modelling opinion dynamics is [4] where exact consensus is shown to occur if the graph
of network is strongly connected. This notion is transcended to partial consensus under the presence of stubborn
agents in [5]. The study on stubbornness is extended to relatively more sophisticated network topologies such
as Erdos–Renyi random graphs and small-world graphs in [6]. A nonlinear attraction force is considered on top
of linear stubbornness force in [7].
The disagreements in social networks have been studied extensively in the opinion dynamics literature.
The origin of disagreement in the network is declared as culture, ethnicity, or religion in [8]. On the other hand,
origin of disagreement is assumed to be competition among the agents in [9] and [10]. The question of whether
cooperation can result from such a competition is answered in these studies as well. For a comprehensive
survey on origins of cooperation and competition among human beings, you may see [11]. The disagreements
among the agents have been modelled as antagonistic interactions in [12] and [13]. In so-called Altafini model,
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negative edge weights are utilized for antagonistic interactions, and consensus occurs on two separate positive
and negative opinions [14–17]. It is shown that disagreements result in clusters of opinions in [18–20]. Similar to
our study, the disagreements are modelled as repulsion between the agents in [21] and disagreements are shown
to result in oscillations of opinions in [22]. However, explicit trajectories are not evaluated in these methods,
which distinguishes it from our method.
Our main contribution is to establish that opinion transactions in a social network can be modeled as a
differential game under the presence of a troll. Here, troll is regarded as a malicious content maker in the social
network and he is a stubborn agent who disagrees with everyone and with whom everybody disagrees. Another
study which focuses on differential game of opinions in social networks is [23]. Here, this notion is extended
to the social networks which comprise a troll in addition to ordinary agents. Explicit expressions of opinions
are derived for such a scenario by using Pontryagin’s principle based on [24]. Such a game theoretical model of
social networks is useful since it provides a rigorous mathematical tool which provides a deeper understanding
of opinion dynamics under the presence of a troll.
The paper is organized as follows. The differential game based optimization problem of opinion dynamics
is introduced in Section 2. The main theorem on Nash equilibrium and the resulting opinion trajectories is
presented in Section 3. An example of dispute on a topic in social networks is argued in Section 4. Conclusions
and future works are discussed in Section 5. Finally, the appendix is dedicated to the comprehensive derivation
of explicit expressions of opinion trajectories.
2. Problem definition
Our objective is to model opinion dynamics of a social network as a differential game played by a troll in addition
to n − 1 ordinary agents. This problem is crucial since it provides insight into the dynamics of opinions by
using rigorous differential games and Nash equilibrium concepts. The cost functionals of the troll and ordinary
agents in this game are respectively,
1
J1 (x, b1 , u1 ) =
2

∫

∑

τ

{w11 (x1 − b1 )2 + u21 −
0

pj (x1 − xj )2 }dt,

(1)

j∈{N −{1}}

and
1
Ji (x, bi , ui ) =
2

∫

τ

{wii (xi − bi )2 + u2i − ri (xi − x1 )2 +
0

∑

wij (xi − xj )2 }dt

f or i = 2, 3, ..., n, (2)

j∈{N −{1,i}}

where agent 1 is the troll and the other n−1 agents are ordinary. Ji is the cost functional minimized by the ith
agent. The quantities bi = xi (0), and xi (t) are the initial and instantaneous opinions of agents, respectively.
The vector with xi (t) at the ith entry is denoted by x(t) , which thus represents all opinions at time t . During
the game, the ith agent commands ui (t), its control input at t . The duration of the game of information
transaction is fixed and it is equal to τ . The constant wii is the stubbornness coeﬀicient of ith agent and wij
represents the influence of j th agent on the ith agent. The constant pj measures the repulsion of j th agent
to the troll when positive and ri , the repulsion of troll to the ith agent. Also, let N denote the set of agents
N = {1, 2, ..., n} which is fixed throughout the game. It will be assumed that all real numbers wij , ri , pj are
nonnegative so that there is repulsion between troll and ordinary agents. ri , pj will occasionally be allowed to
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be negative as well, in order to be able to compare this game with a previously considered game in [23]. The
technical analysis below will be valid for ri , pj ∈ IR although our focus is on the case ri , pj ≥ 0 as our main
objective is to investigate networks with a troll.
The first components in the integrals of (1) and (2) represent the stubbornness of agents and, the second,
their cumulative control efforts. The third components measure the cumulative disagreement between the troll
and the ordinary agents, and the last components in (2) stand for the influence among the ordinary agents. To
sum up, the troll is modelled as a stubborn agent who disagrees with other agents and with whom the other
agents disagree, but allow mutual positive as well as negative influences. Under this scenario, the game played
by the agents is
min{Ji } subject to ẋi = ui

f or i = 1, 2, ..., n,

ui

(3)

so that the agents control their rate of change of opinion and thereby try to minimize their individual costs of
holding an opinion.
This game is similar to that in [23] with the significant difference of existence of a troll. This brings in a
brand new technical dimension to the game as it makes the cost functionals nonconvex. The troll disagrees with
ordinary agents via the ri coeﬀicients, and the ordinary agents disagree with the troll via pj coeﬀicients. This
provides a new degree of freedom in the social network as, in the default case when ri , pj ’s are nonnegative,
varying degrees of repulsion between the troll and the ordinary agents can be examined for its effect on the
evolution of opinions. It is assumed that there is a single troll and single opinion, but these can be generalized
to higher dimensions trivially.
Obtaining the opinion trajectories of the differential game in (3) is a comprehensive task which requires
the following step by step approach. First of all, the cost functions in (1) and (2) are converted to Hamiltonians
with ease. Secondly, the Pontryagin’s principle is used for evaluating the ordinary differential equations for those
Hamiltonians. Those differential equations are transformed to state equations by a straightforward substitution
of variables. The problem that we obtain is an LTI boundary value problem whose closed form solution is of
interest. In order to convert the boundary value problem to initial value problem, the unspecified terminal
condition in Pontryagin’s principle is imposed. The solution to the resulting initial value problem is determined
in terms of blocks of state transition matrix. By substituting the matrix functions into those blocks, the eventual
explicit expressions of opinion trajectories are calculated.
3. Main results
In this section, the main theorem on the opinion trajectories is presented. The extensive derivation of opinion
trajectories is left to the appendix.
Suppose that the entries of s vector are given by
si = wii bi
and let





Q=



f or i = 1, 2, ..., n,

q11
r2
r3
..
.

p2
q22
−w32
..
.

rn

−wn2

p3
−w23
q33

···
···
..

.
...


pn
−w2n 


 ∈ IRn×n ,


qnn

(4)
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where
q11
q22
q33
..
.

= w11 − p2 − p3 − · · · − pn
= −r2 + w22 + w23 + · · · + w2n
= −r3 + w32 + w33 + · · · + w3n
..
=
.

qnn

= −rn + wn2 + wn3 + · · · + wnn .

(5)

Theorem 1 Consider the game (1)-(3). Let Q be nonsingular.
(i) A necessary condition for a Nash equilibrium to exist in the interval [0, τ ) is that Q does not have a negative
π
eigenvalue −r2 satisfying r = (2k + 1) 2τ
for any integer k .

(ii) If (i) holds, then the opinion trajectories of any Nash equilibrium are given by xj (t); t ∈ [0, τ ), j = 1, ..., n ,
where with x = [x1 , ..., xn ]T
x(t) =

for a square root

√

√
√
√
√
{cosh( Qt) − sinh( Qt)cosh( Qτ )−1 sinh( Qτ )}b
√
√
√
√
+{(I − cosh( Qt))Q−1 + sinh( Qt)Q−1 cosh( Qτ )−1 sinh( Qτ )}s,

(6)

Q of Q.

Remark 1 The condition ii states that if the Nash equilibrium of the game (1)-(3) exists, then it is necessarily
in the form subscribed by x(t) in (6). The opinion trajectory (6) expresses the evolution of the opinions of
n-agents starting from the initial opinions bi ’s. The opinion xi (t) at time t of agent-i is dependent on the
initial opinions of all agents. This necessitates that the Nash equilibrium opinion trajectories are expressed in
a vector form, i.e. in a coupled or interactive expression (6). In certain special cases it is possible to express
the Nash opinion trajectories of each agent in a decoupled form [23].
Remark 2 Since the individual cost functions (1), (2) are not in general convex, the fact that the given solution
is indeed a Nash equilibrium is not easy to establish. However, the special cases examined in Corollary 1 strongly
indicate that this is plausible.
Remark 3 A more compact expression for (6) is obtained with W := [wij ] as
x(t) = {Q−1 W + cosh[H(τ − t)]cosh(Hτ )−1 (I − Q−1 W )}b

(7)

where H is the square root of Q . This expression at t = τ can be used to obtain the disparity, or distance,
among opinions at the end of the interval of interaction.
Corollary 1 If in (1) and (2), pj = −w1j , rj = −wj1 for j = 2, ..., n for positive w1j , wj1 , then a Nash
equilibrium exists and is unique.
Remark 4 Note that the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium occurs in this special case, where the
troll conforms to the society. Such a Nash equilibrium has been examined in detail in [23] with its multivariable
(multiopinion) extension given in [25].
Remark 5 If Q has a negative eigenvalue −r2 such that r is not an odd multiple of
of x(t) are oscillatory. As τ gets closer to a value so as to have r = (2k +

π
1) 2τ

, then some entries

for some integer k , then the

amplitude of oscillation gets larger to eventually prohibit the existence of an equilibrium.
3262
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4. Application example
In this section, three examples are presented where the issue is the punishment for violence to women. A large
positive opinion indicates that the violence to women should be punished severely whereas a large negative
opinion indicates that violence to women is favorable. In order to understand the mechanism of such a discussion,
three experiments are constructed as follows. The parameters of those experiments are listed in Tables 1 and
2. In these tables, U(a, b) stands for uniformly distributed random variable between a and b.
Table 1. Parameter values for Figure 1.
Figure 1-Case 1

Figure 1-Case 2

Figure 1-Case 3

n = 50 agents
τ =2s
Ts = 0.001 s
pj = 0 f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
ri = 0 f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
w11 = 6
wij ∼ U (0, 0.1) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
b1 = −10
bi ∼ U (0, 40) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n

n = 50 agents
τ =2s
Ts = 0.001 s
pj = 0 f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
ri = 0 f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
w11 = 6
wij ∼ U (0, 0.2) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
b1 = −10
bi ∼ U (0, 40) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n

n = 50 agents
τ =2s
Ts = 0.001 s
pj = 0 f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
ri = 0 f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
w11 = 6
wij ∼ U (0, 0.3) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
b1 = −10
bi ∼ U (0, 40) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n

Table 2. Parameter values for Figure 2.
Figure 2-Case 1

Figure 2-Case 2

Figure 2-Case 3

n = 50 agents
τ =2s
Ts = 0.001 s
pj ∼ U (0, 5) f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
ri ∼ U (0, 5) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
w11 = 6
wij ∼ U (0, 0.2) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
b1 = −10
bi ∼ U (0, 40) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
Figure 2-Case 4

n = 50 agents
τ =2s
Ts = 0.001 s
pj ∼ U (0, 5) f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
ri ∼ U (0, 5) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
w11 = 6
wij ∼ U (0, 0.4) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
b1 = −10
bi ∼ U (0, 40) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
Figure 2-Case 5

n = 50 agents
τ =2s
Ts = 0.001 s
pj ∼ U (0, 5) f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
ri ∼ U (0, 5) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
w11 = 6
wij ∼ U (0, 0.6) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
b1 = −10
bi ∼ U (0, 40) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
Figure 2-Case 6

n = 50 agents
τ =2s
Ts = 0.001 s
pj ∼ U (5, 10) f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
ri ∼ U (5, 10) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
w11 = 6
wij ∼ U (0, 0.2) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
b1 = −10
bi ∼ U (0, 40) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n

n = 50 agents
τ =2s
Ts = 0.001 s
pj ∼ U (5, 10) f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
ri ∼ U (5, 10) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
w11 = 6
wij ∼ U (0, 0.4) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
b1 = −10
bi ∼ U (0, 40) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n

n = 50 agents
τ =2s
Ts = 0.001 s
pj ∼ U (5, 10) f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
ri ∼ U (5, 10) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
w11 = 6
wij ∼ U (0, 0.6) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
f or j = 2, 3, ..., n
b1 = −10
bi ∼ U (0, 40) f or i = 2, 3, ..., n
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In Figure 1, the case where there is no interaction between troll and ordinary agents is investigated. In
other words, the only communication between the troll and ordinary agents, i.e. repulsion is considered as
zero in the first experiment. In this case, the opinion of troll does not change since he is stubborn and attains
constant opinion. On the other hand, there is intensive interaction among the ordinary agents which drives the
system towards consensus. As the number of ordinary agents or wij parameters in (2) increase, exact consensus
occurs at the average of initial opinions,i.e. x(τ ) = 20. The case where there is attraction between the troll
and ordinary agents can also be considered by setting pj and ri in (1) and (2) to negative values. Then, the
first agent will be partial troll who sometimes claims plausible arguments and conforms to society.
Optimal opinion trajectories for single
issue-Case2

40

40

30

30
Opinion intensity (m)

Opinion intensity (m)

Optimal opinion trajectories for single
issue-Case1

20
10
0
-10
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0
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0.2

0.4
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0.8

1
1.2
Time (sec)
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2

Optimal opinion trajectories for single
issue-Case3
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0
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-20
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1
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1.4
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Figure 1. Optimal opinion trajectories for no repulsion between troll and ordinary agents during the game of opinion
transactions: this illustration shows that the troll will not change his opinion if the repulsion parameter is zero, as the
mere interaction between troll and ordinary agents is via the repulsion parameter.

In Figure 2, it is observed that the initial opinion of troll is negative where he claims that women deserve
violence. Then, a reaction arises from the network which results in alternations of the opinion of troll where he
3264
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attains negative and positive opinions periodically. Such alternations are a typical feature of trolls since they are
more inconsistent compared to the ordinary agents. The alternations emerge because the troll regrets his initial
strange opinion and temporarily conforms to society. He apologizes and adopts a reasonable opinion; however,
the strange opinions emerge after some time. The frequency of alternations which represent the intensity of
inconsistency increases as repulsion parameters increase. The opinion trajectories of ordinary agents reveal that
they are more consistent compared to the troll. Their opinions exhibit a consensus towards a positive value
of the issue that is considered here, namely violence to women. Therefore, they consistently claim that the
violence to women should be punished throughout the excessive transactions of opinions.
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Figure 2. We visualize the optimal opinion trajectories for various parameters here. This illustrates the fluctuations
of opinion of troll due to his underlying inconsistency. No matter how the troll behaves, the ordinary agents exhibit
a cooperative communication which results in consensus except in Case 4. This case stands out because the repulsion
parameter in this case dominates the influence parameters that have smaller values than in other cases.

In Figure 3, our main objective is to illustrate the case where item (i) in Theorem 1 is violated. In other
words, the opinion exchange duration τ is allowed to get close to

π
2r

where −r2 is a negative eigenvalue of

Q matrix in (4). In this experiment, the number of agents is selected as n = 20 and the sampling period is
equal to Ts = 0.001. The pj parameters in (1) and ri parameters in (2) are selected as uniformly distributed
between [0, 5]. The w11 parameter is chosen as 6 and the w entries in (5) are selected as uniformly distributed
between [0, 0.03] . The initial opinions bi in (2) are assigned as uniformly distributed between [0, 15]. For these
parameter selections, Q matrix in (4) has a negative eigenvalue λ1 = −56.523. The r parameter in item (i) of
√
π
Theorem 1 is equal to r = −λ1 which corresponds to r = 7.518. Thus, the game duration τ = 2r
turns out
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to be τ = 0.209. Under these selections of parameters, it is expected that some of the opinion intensities will
blow up to large unstable values according to item (i) of Theorem 1. In Figure 3, it is indeed observed that the
opinion intensity of troll assume large values under this scenario.
Opinion dynamics with arbitrary information structure
Single opinion
Optimal trajectories for N=20 particles

500

Opinion intensity (m)

0
-500
-1000
-1500
-2000
-2500
-3000
0

0.05

0.1

0.15
Time (sec)

0.2

0.25

Figure 3. Approximately unstable case is shown for optimal opinion trajectories in which game duration τ is allowed
π
to get close to 2r
where −r2 is a negative eigenvalue of Q in (4). This displays the case where the opinions of troll
blow up to infinity while concentrating on disagreeing with the ordinary agents. The ordinary agents are not adversely
affected by this polarization due to their substantial momentum.

5. Conclusions
In this study, the extension of [23] to networks with a troll is discussed. This corresponds to the case where
certain interaction coeﬀicients in (1) and (2) are repulsive and thus have a minus sign. If those coeﬀicients
are positive, then this boils down to [23] where the solution represents a Nash equilibrium. The fact that the
cost functions are nonconvex presents a challenge to establish the suﬀiciency of the condition (i) of Theorem 1.
Nevertheless, the Nash equilibrium, if it exists, is included in the set of opinion dynamics described by condition
(ii) of Theorem 1.
An extension to multiple issues is in a manner similar to the extension of [23] to [25]. We have considered
in (1) and (2), the unspecified terminal condition case. Alternatives such as specified or free terminal conditions
also need to be examined and may model different ideologies in societies. Finally, the perfect integrator controls
of agents in (3), replaced with more general, still linear, control models may also be explored.
Appendix
Here, the necessary conditions in Section 6.5.1 of [24] are employed in order to determine the explicit expression
(6) in Theorem 1. Since there are two types of agents, namely troll and ordinary agents, we thus have two
different Hamiltonians given by

H1 =

3266
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and
Hi =

1
{wii (xi − bi )2 + u2i − ri (xi − x1 )2 +
2

∑

wij (xi − xj )2 } + ρi ui f or i = 2, 3, ..., n,

j∈{N −{1,i}}

where ρi is the costate of ith agent. The other parameters of these expressions are defined in Section 2 after
(1) and (2). A set of ordinary differential equations are obtained by applying the rules

∂H i
∂ui

i

= 0, ρ̇i = − ∂H
∂xi ,

on the Hamiltonians as
ui
ρ̇1

= −ρi ,
= −{w11 (x1 − b1 ) −

∑

f or i = 1, 2, ..., n
pj (x1 − xj )},

j∈{N −{1}}

ρ̇i

= −{wii (xi − bi ) − ri (xi − x1 ) +

ẋi

= ui

∑

wij (xi − xj )}f or i = 2, 3, ..., n

(8)

j∈{N −{1,i}}

f or i = 1, 2, ..., n.
ρi (τ ) = 0

(9)

f or i = 1, 2, ..., n.

The last boundary condition is known as the unspecified terminal condition in optimal control terminology. The differential equations in (8) can be written in compact form as the following state equation
[

ẋ
ρ̇

]

[
=

0
−I
−Q 0

][

x(t)
ρ(t)

]

[
+

0
s

]
,

(10)

where x := [ x1 , ..., xn ]′ , ρ := [ ρ1 , ..., ρn ]′ , s := [ s1 , ..., sn ]′ and Q ∈ IRn×n . The entries of s vector are
given by
si = wii bi

f or i = 1, 2, ..., n.

where wii and bi are introduced after (2).
The Q matrix in (10) can be written explicitly as (4) where the diagonal entries are given by (5).
The solution of the LTI system in (10) is determined as
[

x(t)
ρ(t)

]

[
= ϕ(t)

b
ρ(0)

]
+ ψ(t, 0)s.

(11)

Here, ψ(t, 0) ∈ IR2n×n and state transition matrix ϕ(t) ∈ IR2n×2n can be computed in Laplace transform
domain as
[
]
[
]−1
ϕ11 (t) ϕ12 (t)
sI I
ϕ(t) =
:= L−1 {
},
ϕ21 (t)[ ϕ22 (t)
Q sI
]
∫ t
(12)
ϕ12 (t − τ̃ )
ψ(t, t0 ) :=
dτ̃ ,
ϕ22 (t − τ̃ )
t0
where state transition matrix blocks ϕij (t) ∈ IRn×n . The matrix inversion above is calculated using block
matrices as
[
]−1 [
]
sI I
s(s2 I − Q)−1
−(s2 I − Q)−1
=
.
Q sI
−Q(s2 I − Q)−1 s(s2 I − Q)−1
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The blocks of state transition matrix ϕij (t) can be obtained using inverse Laplace transform which gives
√
ϕ11 (t) = ϕ22 (t) =√cosh(√ Qt)
−1
ϕ12 (t) = −sinh(
Qt)(
√
√ Q)
ϕ21 (t) = − Qsinh( Qt),

(13)

√
ψ1 (t, 0) = (I − cosh(
Qt))Q−1
√
√
ψ2 (t, 0) = sinh( Qt)( Q)−1 ,

(14)

where ψi (t, 0) ∈ IRn×n . The initial costate ρ(0) can be obtained by imposing the boundary condition in (9) on
the solution in (12)
ρ(τ ) = ϕ21 (τ )b + ϕ22 (τ )ρ(0) + ψ2 (τ, 0)s.

Thus, the boundary value problem in (8) and (9) can be converted to an initial value problem by using
the above relation. The initial costate ρ(0) above can be plugged into the solution in (12) to obtain the opinion
trajectories as
x(t) =

{ϕ11 (t) − ϕ12 (t)ϕ22 (τ )−1 ϕ21 (τ )}b
+{ψ1 (t, 0) − ϕ12 (t)ϕ22 (τ )−1 ψ2 (τ, 0)}s,

(15)

√
√
provided ϕ22 (τ )−1 exists. This is the case if and only if ϕ22 (t) = cosh( Qt) is nonsingular where Q is a
possibly nonreal square root of Q. This in turn is equivalent to condition (i) of Theorem 1, by [25]. The
necessity of the condition (i) is thus established.
If the matrix blocks in (13) and (14) are plugged into (15), the explicit solution can be obtained for the
opinion trajectories as
x(t) =

√
√
√
√
{cosh( Qt) −√sinh( Qt)cosh( √Qτ )−1 sinh( Qτ
√ )}b
√
+{(I − cosh( Qt))Q−1 + sinh( Qt)Q−1 cosh( Qτ )−1 sinh( Qτ )}s.

This proves the condition (ii). Note that under the circumstance of Remark 5,

√

Q will be complex in

general. This expression will still result in an opinion trajectory with real entries because x(t) is a function of
√
Q , i.e. an even function of Q.
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